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Abstract
Given a set X of natural numbers, we may formalize “The formula φ is a
theorem of ω-logic over the theory T using an oracle for X” by an expres-
sion [I|X ]Tφ, defined using a least fixed point in the language of second-order
arithmetic. We will prove that the consistency and reflection principles aris-
ing from this notion of provability lead to axiomatizations of Π11-CA0 and
Π11-CA0 with bar induction. We compare this to well-known results that
reflection for ω-derivable formulas and ω-model reflection are equivalent to
bar induction.
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1. Introduction
Reflection principles in formal arithmetic are statements of the form “If
φ is a theorem of T , then φ” [12]. Using notation from provability logic [4],
for a computably enumerable theory T we may use Tφ to denote a natural
formalization of “φ is a theorem of T”. Then, the above statement may be
written succinctly as Tφ → φ. If φ is a sentence, this gives us an instance
of local reflection. Although such principles merely state the soundness of
T , they can almost never be proven within T itself. For example, setting
φ ≡ 0 6= 1, we see that Tφ → φ is equivalent to ∼T0 6= 1, which asserts
the consistency of T and hence is unprovable within T itself (if T satisfies
the assumptions of Go¨dels second incompleteness theorem). More generally,
by Lo¨b’s theorem we have that T ⊢ Tφ→ φ only if φ is already a theorem
of T [13].
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We can extend reflection to formulas φ(x), obtaining uniform reflection
principles, denoted RFN[T ]. These are given by the scheme
∀x
(
Tφ(x¯)→ φ(x)
)
,
where x¯ denotes the numeral of x.
Uniform reflection principles are particularly appealing because they some-
times give rise to familiar theories. If we use PRA to denote primitive recur-
sive arithmetic, Kreisel and Le´vy proved in [12] that
PA ≡ PRA+ RFN[PRA];
in fact, we may replace PRA by the weaker elementary arithmetic (EA), ob-
tained by restricting the induction shema in Peano arithmetic to ∆00 formulas
and adding an axiom asserting that the exponential function is total [2].
Recall that the ω-rule is an infinitary deduction rule that has the following
form:
φ(0¯),Γ φ(1¯),Γ φ(2¯),Γ . . .
∀xφ(x),Γ
,
and ω-logic is the logic generated by the ω-rule together with the standard
finitary rules of the Tait calculus. More generally, ω-logic over T allows for
sequents derivable in T to be used as axioms.
In this article, we will study formalizations of ω-reflection in second-order
arithmetic; that is, statements of the form “If φ is a theorem of ω-logic, then
φ”. The question readily arises as to what it means for φ to be a theorem of
ω-logic. There are at least three ways to model this. Informally, they are:
(i) There is a well-founded derivation tree formalizing an ω-proof of φ, in
which case we will write [P]φ.
(ii) There is a well-order Λ such that φ belongs to the set of theorems of
ω-logic defined by transfinite recursion on Λ, in which case we will write
[R]φ.
(iii) The formula φ belongs to the least set closed under the rules and axioms
of ω-logic. If this is the case, we will write [I]φ.
Although we will discuss these in greater detail later, the ideas behind [P]φ
and [I]φ should be clear; [P]φ gives a ‘local’ view of φ being a theorem of
ω-logic by considering (infinite) ω-proofs of φ, while [I]φ gives a more global
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perspective, describing the set of theorems of ω-logic as a whole via an induc-
tive definition. Meanwhile, [R]φ describes the approximations to the fixed
point used in [I]φ via transfinite recursion.
Over a strong enough formal theory, one can show that all of these notions
of provability are equivalent. However, from the point of view of a weak
theory, they may vary in strength. For X ∈ {P,R, I} and A ⊆ N, let us write
[X|A]φ if φ is provable in the sense of X from the atomic diagram of A. Then,
we define a schema
ωX-RFN ≡ ∀A ∀n
(
[X|A]φ(n¯, A¯)→ φ(n,A)
)
;
the notation A¯ indicates a second-order constant added to represent A. If
Γ is a set of formulas, ωX-RFNΓ is the restriction of this scheme to φ ∈ Γ.
Then, over RCA0 we have that:
ωP-RFN ≡ Π
1
ω-BI0; (1)
ωR-RFNΠ1
2
≡ ATR0. (2)
(We will review the theories Π1ω-BI0 of full bar induction and ATR0 of arith-
metical transfinite recursion in §2). The first item is proven in [1] and the
second in [6]. As we will see, if we use ωX-RFNΓ[T ] to denote a variant of the
scheme where ω-logic is extended by theorems of T , (2) generalizes to
ωR-RFNΣ1
n+1
[ACA0] ≡ ATR0 +Π
1
n-BI (3)
(which is just Π1n-BI0 if n > 1). Moreover, (1) also holds for ω-model re-
flection, the scheme asserting that any formula true in every ω-model must
be true [11]. This begs the question: is ωI-RFN also equivalent to a natural
theory? In this article, we answer the question affirmatively, and prove that:
ωI-RFNΠ13
≡ Π11-CA0; (4)
ωI-RFNΣ1
n+1
[ACA0] ≡ Π
1
1-CA0 +Π
1
n-BI. (5)
Both equivalences are proven over the theory ECA0 of elementary compre-
hension, which is strictly weaker than RCA0 or even RCA
∗
0.
Layout of the article
In §2 we establish some basic notation we will use, and review the subsys-
tems of second-order arithmetic that will be of interest to us. In §3 we review
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formalizations of ω-logic in the literature, and in §4 we review ω-models,
which give rise to another family of reflection principles, also equivalent to
bar induction. In §5 we give our formalizations using inductive definitions.
In §6 we discuss completeness results for ω-logic and prove (3), and §7 in-
troduces the reflection principles based on our fixed point construction and
proves partial results leading to (4) and (5). The latter are proven in §8 using
β-models.
2. Second-order arithmetical theories
In this section we review some basic notions of second-order arithmetic
and mention some important theories that will appear throughout the article.
2.1. Conventions of syntax
It will be convenient to work within a Tait-style calculus, so we will
consider a language without negation, except on primitive predicates. Thus
terms and formulas will be built from the symbols 0, 1,+,×, exp,=, 6=,∈, 6∈,
representing the standard constants, operations and relations on the natural
numbers, along with the Booleans ∧,∨ and the quantifires ∀, ∃. The rank
of a formula is the number of logical symbols (Booleans and quantifiers)
that appear in it. We assume a countably infinite set of first-order variables
n,m, x, y, z . . . , which will always be denoted by lower-case letters, as well
as a countably infinite set of second-order variables. It will be convenient
to assume that the second-order variables are enumerated by V = 〈Vi〉i∈N,
although we may also use X, Y, Z, . . . to denote set-variables. Tuples of first-
order terms or second-order variables will be denoted with a boldface font,
e.g. t, X. In general, if S = 〈Si〉i∈N is a sequence we will write S<n for
〈Si〉i<n. We also include countably many set-constants O = 〈Oi〉i∈N, which
will be used as ‘oracles’ (see §3.2).
We define x ≤ y by ∃z (y = x + z) and x < y by x + 1 ≤ y. In the
meta-language we may also use the symbol ‘=’, although sometimes we use
‘≡’ instead in order to distinguish it from the object-language equality. Since
we have no negation in the language, we define ∼φ by using De Morgan’s
laws and the classical dualities for quantifiers. In particular, we define φ→ ψ
by ∼φ ∨ ψ. The set of all formulas will be denoted Π1ω.
Fix some elementary Go¨del numbering mapping a formula ψ ∈ Π1ω to a
natural number pψq; terms and sequents of formulas are also assigned Go¨del
numbers. Since we will be working mainly inside theories of arithmetic, we
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will often identify ψ with pψq. For a natural number n, define a term n¯
recursively by 0¯ = 0 and n+ 1 = (n¯) + 1. We will assume that the Go¨del
numbering has the natural property that pψq < pφq whenever ψ is a proper
subformula of φ.
We use ∆00 to denote the set of all formulas, possibly with set parameters
but without the occurrence of the set-constants Oi, where no second-order
quantifiers appear and all first-order quantifiers are bounded, that is, of the
form ∀x < t φ or ∃x < t φ. Observe that in our presentation, a ∆00 formula
may contain exponential bounds. We simultaneously define Σ00 = Π
0
0 = ∆
0
0
and recursively define Σ0n+1 to be the set of all formulas of the form ∃xφ with
φ ∈ Π0n, and similarly Π
0
n+1 to be the set of all formulas of the form ∀xφ with
φ ∈ Σ0n. We denote by Π
0
ω the union of all Π
0
n; these are the arithmetical
formulas.
The classes Σ1n,Π
1
n are defined analogously, but using second-order quan-
tifiers, and setting Σ10 = Π
1
0 = ∆
1
0 = Π
0
ω. It is well-known that every second-
order formula is equivalent to another in one of the above forms. We use a
lightface font for the analogous classes where no set-variables appear free:
∆mn ,Π
m
n ,Σ
m
n . For lightface classes of formulas, we may write Γ(Y ) to indi-
cate that the second-order variables in Y may appear free (and no others).
Finally, if Γ is a set of formulas and n is a natural number, we use Π1n/Γ to
denote the set of formulas of the form ∀Xn∃Xn−1, . . . , Q1X1φ, with φ ∈ Γ
and Q1 ∈ {∀, ∃}.
We will also use pseudo-terms to simplify notation, where an expression
ϕ(t(x)) should be understood as a shorthand for ∃y
(
ψ(x, y)∧ϕ(y)
)
, with ψ a
∆00 formula defining the graph of the intended interpretation of t. Similarly,
an elementary pseudo-term is an expression ∃y < s(x)
(
ψ(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y)
)
,
where s is a standard term bounding the values of t(x). The domain of the
functions defined by these pseudo-terms may be a proper subset of N.
Let us list some of the (pseudo-)terms we will use:
1. An elementary term 〈x, y〉 which returns a code of the ordered pair
formed by x and y and elementary projection terms so that (〈x, y〉)0 = x
and (〈x, y〉)1 = y. We will overload this notation by also using it for
sequences, coded in a standard way. As with tuples of variables, we
use a boldface font when a first-order object is meant to be regarded
as a sequence. For a sequence s, we will also use (s)i to denote an
elementary pseudo-term which picks out the ith element of s if it exists,
and is undefined otherwise, and |s| denotes an elementary pseudo-term
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for the length of s. If n ∈ N, s⌢ n denotes the sequence obtained by
adjoining n to s as its last element.
2. An elementary term x mapping a natural number to the code of its
numeral.
3. A (non-elementary) term JxK which, when x codes a closed term t,
returns the value of t as a natural number.
4. For every formula φ and variables x0, . . . , xm, an elementary term
φ(x˙0, . . . , x˙m) which, given natural numbers n0, . . . , nm, returns the
code of the outcome of φ[x/n¯], i.e., the code of φ(n¯0, . . . , n¯m). We
will often write such a term as φ(x˙).
Note that we may also use this notation in the meta-language. As is
standard, we may define X ⊆ Y by ∀x(x ∈ X → x ∈ Y ), and X = Y by
X ⊆ Y ∧Y ⊆ X . If the set F is meant to represent a function, we may write
y = F (x) instead of 〈x, y〉 ∈ F . Sequents will be first-order objects of the
form γ = 〈γ1, . . . , γn〉, where each γi is a formula. We will treat sequents as
sets, defining φ ∈ γ by ∃i < |γ| φ = (γ)i, and define γ ⊆ δ similarly. The
difference between the first- and second-order use of these symbols will be
clarified by the use of uppercase or lowercase letters. We may write γ, φ or
(γ, φ) instead of γ ⌢ φ. We similarly use γ, δ to denote the concatenation
of γ and δ. The empty sequent will be denoted by ⊥; observe that we do
not take it to be a symbol of our formal language.
2.2. Basic rules and axioms
We will work with a one-sided Tait-style calculus, which proves sequents
of the form γ = 〈γi〉i<n, as defined in e.g. [15]. In such a calculus, negation
may only be applied to atomic formulas. We assume that the Tait calculus
is formalized in such a way that the scheme stating that γ, α is derivable
whenever α is a true atomic sentence is provable in ECA0; this is not a strong
assumption, as Σ01-completeness is provable in EA for standard calculi [10].
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We will also assume that at least the following rules are available:
(lem)
γ, α,∼α
(=)
γ, α γ, r = r′
γ, α′
(∧)
γ, φ γ, ψ
γ, φ ∧ ψ
(∨)
γ, φ, ψ
γ, φ ∨ ψ
(∀0)
γ, φ(v)
γ, ∀xφ(x)
(∃0)
γ, φ(t)
γ, ∃xφ(x)
(∀1)
γ, φ(V )
γ, ∀Xφ(X)
(∃1)
γ, φ(Y )
γ, ∃Xφ(X)
(cut)
γ, φ γ,∼φ
γ
,
where α is atomic, v, V do not appear free in γ, and α′ is obtained from α
by replacing some instances of r by r′. We denote this calculus by Tait;
Tait
ρ is the restriction of Tait which allows cuts only for formulas of rank
less than ρ ≤ ω (in particular, Tait = Taitω).
2.3. Successor induction and comprehension
As our ‘background theory’ we will use Robinson’s arithmetic Q [10] (es-
sentially, PA without induction), enriched with axioms for the exponential;
call the resulting theory Q+. Aside from the basic axioms of Q+, the follow-
ing schemes will be useful in axiomatizing many theories of interest to us.
Below, Γ denotes a set of formulas.
Γ-CA: ∃X∀x
(
x ∈ X ↔ φ(x)
)
, where φ ∈ Γ and X is not free in φ;
∆01-CA: ∀x
(
π(x)↔ σ(x)
)
→ ∃X∀x
(
x ∈ X ↔ σ(x)
)
,
where σ ∈ Σ01, π ∈ Π
0
1, and X is not free in σ or π;
IΓ: φ(0) ∧ ∀x
(
φ(x)→ φ(x+ 1)
)
→ ∀x φ(x), where φ ∈ Γ;
Ind: 0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x
(
x ∈ X → x+ 1 ∈ X
)
→ ∀x (x ∈ X).
With this, we may define the following theories:
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ECA0 ≡ Q
+ + Ind+∆00-CA;
RCA∗0 ≡ Q
+ + Ind+∆01-CA;
RCA0 ≡ Q
+ + IΣ01 +∆
0
1-CA;
ACA0 ≡ Q
+ + Ind+Σ01-CA;
Π11-CA0 ≡ Q
+ + Ind+Π11-CA.
Recall that we have included the exponential as a function symbol in our
language; without it, RCA∗0 would require an additional axiom Exp stating
that the exponential is total. In the case of ECA0, an alternative presentation
without an exponential symbol would be less natural. Later we will make use
of the fact that (in particular) ACA0 is finitely axiomatizable [17, Lemma
VIII.1.5].
Next, it will be useful to give a somewhat more economical (but equiva-
lent) representation of Π11-CA0.
Theorem 2.1. The theory Π11-CA0 is equivalent to
Q+ + Ind + (Π11/Σ
0
2)-CA.
Proof sketch. In [17, Lemma V.1.4], it is proven that any Π11 formula is
equivalent to one of the form ∀f : N → N φ(f), where φ ∈ Σ01. If fun(F ) ∈
Π02(F ) is a formula stating that F is the graph of a function, this is in turn
equivalent to some formula ∀F
(
∼fun(F ) ∨ φ′(F )
)
∈ Π11/Σ
0
2, where φ
′ is
obtained by modifying φ in the obvious way.
2.4. Transfinite recursion and bar induction
We mention two further theories that will appear later and require a more
elaborate setup. We may represent well-orders in second-order arithmetic as
pairs of sets Λ = 〈|Λ|, <Λ〉, and define
Progφ(Λ) = ∀λ
((
∀ξ<Λλ φ(ξ)
)
→ φ(λ)
)
TIφ(Λ) = ∀λ ∈ |Λ|
(
Progφ(Λ)→ ∀λ ∈ |Λ| φ(λ)
)
WF(Λ) = ∀X TIλ∈X(Λ)
WO(Λ) = LO(Λ) ∧ WF(Λ),
where LO(Λ) is a formula expressing that Λ is a linear order.
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Given a set X whose elements we will regard as ordered pairs 〈λ, n〉, let
Xλ be the set of all n with 〈λ, n〉 ∈ X , and X<Λλ be the set of all 〈η, n〉 with
η <Λ λ. With this, we define the transfinite recursion scheme by
TRφ(X,Λ) = ∀λ ∈ |Λ| ∀n
(
n ∈ Xλ ↔ φ(n,X<Λλ)
)
.
Finally, we define
ATR0 ≡ ACA0 +
{
∀Λ
(
WO(Λ)→ ∃XTRφ(X,Λ)
)
: φ ∈ Π0ω
}
;
Γ-BI0 ≡ ACA0 +
{
∀Λ
(
WO(Λ)→ TIφ(Λ)
)
: φ ∈ Γ
}
.
These theories are rather powerful, yet as we will see, Π11-CA0 proves very
strong reflection principles for both of them; this is particularly remarkable
in the case of Π1ω-BI0, which is not a subtheory of Π
1
1-CA0. The following is
proven in [16]:
Lemma 2.2. Π11-BI0 6⊆ ATR0 ( Σ
1
1-BI0.
To be precise, Π11-BI0 ≡ Σ
1
1-DC0, a theory known to be incomparable
with ATR0.
3. Formalized ω-logic
In this section we will give the necessary definitions in order to reason
about ω-logic within second-order arithmetic, and introduce the provability
operator [P] based on ω-proofs.
3.1. Formalized deduction
For our purposes, a theory is a set of sequents defined by an arithmetical
formula Tγ, where γ is a first-order variable. For ρ ≤ ω, fix Rule
ρ(x, y) ∈
∆00 such that it is provable in ECA0 that if Rule
ρ(x, y) holds, then x codes a
sequence of sequents 〈δi〉i<n and y codes a sequent γ, and such that
〈δi〉i<n
γ
is an instance of a rule of Taitρ if and only if Ruleρ(〈δi〉i<n,γ) holds.
We also need to formalize the infinitary Tait calculus with the ω-rule,
which we denote by ω-Tait. Recall that this rule has infinitely many premises,
and has the following form:
〈γ, φ(n¯) : n ∈ ω〉
γ, ∀x φ(x)
.
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We can formalize this using the following expression:
ω-Rule(P,γ) ≡ ∃φ ∈ γ ∃x, ψ < φ
(
φ = ∀xψ(x) ∧ ∀z
(
γ, ψ(z˙) ∈ P
))
.
Here, P is a set-variable. The formula ω-Rule(P,γ) states that γ follows by
applying one ω-rule to elements of P , and will be used in our formalizations
of ω-logic.
3.2. Theories with oracles
In order to deal with free second-order variables, we will enrich theories
with oracles. As we have mentioned previously, we will use countably many
constants O = 〈Oi〉i∈N in order to ‘feed’ information about any tuple of sets
of numbers into T . The Oi’s are assumed to be disjoint from the second-order
variables.
To be precise, we first encode finite sequences of sets in a natural way:
for example, we may enconde 〈Ai〉i<n by
A =
{
〈0, n〉
}
∪
{
〈k, i+ 1〉 : k ∈ Ai ∧ i < n
}
.
The pair 〈0, n〉 is included in order to know the length of the sequence, in
case that e.g. An−1 = ∅. As with tuples of natural numbers, let us write
n = |A|.
Then, given a Tait theory T and a set-tuple A, define T |A to be the
theory whose rules and axioms are those of T together with the new rules
(o∈)
γ, k ∈ Oi
for k ∈ Ai and i < |A|
(o6∈)
γ, k 6∈ Oi
for k 6∈ Ai and i < |A|.
It should be clear that these rules can be defined by some arithmetical formula
OrAx(y,A) and we define RuleT |A(x, y) = Rule(x, y) ∨ OrAxT (x,A). If T is
a Tait theory, we will say T |A is a Tait theory with oracles. When working
in T |A1, . . . , An we may write x ∈ A¯i instead of x ∈ Oi to increase legibility;
for example, instead of T |A,Bφ(O0, O1), we may write T |A,Bφ(A¯, B¯).
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3.3. Formalizing ω-logic using proof trees
In [1, 9], derivability in ω-logic is formalized by the existence of an (infi-
nite) derivation tree. It will be convenient to use a standardized representa-
tion of such trees. Let N<ω denote the set of all finite sequences of natural
numbers. We will represent ω-trees as subsets of N<ω. If s, t ∈ N<ω, define
s 4 t if s is an initial segment of t, and ↓ s = {t ∈ S : t 4 s}. Then, say
that an ω-tree is a set S ⊆ N<ω such that ↓S = S. A labeled ω-tree is a pair
〈S, L〉 such that S is an ω-tree and L : S → N.
Definition 3.1. A preproof (for T ) of cut-rank at most ρ ≤ ω is a labeled
ω-tree 〈S, L〉 such that for every s ∈ S, L(s) is a sequent, and there is an
instance
〈δi〉i<ξ
γ
of a rule of ω-Taitρ with ξ ≤ ω such that L(s) = γ and for
all i ∈ N, s ⌢ i ∈ S if and only if i < ξ, in which case L(s ⌢ i) = δi, or
else s is a leaf and T ⊢ L(s). Let PreProofρT (S, L) be a Π
0
1(S, L) formula
stating that 〈S, L〉 is a preproof for T of cut-rank at most ρ.
If S is (upwards) well-founded, we will say that 〈S, L〉 is an ω-proof.
The formula PreProofρT (S, L) would make use of the formulas Rule and
(a mild variant of) ω-Rule defined in §3.1; this is developed in much more
detail, for example, in [9].
Definition 3.2. Given ρ ≤ ω, define a formula [P]ρTγ by
∃S ∃L
(
WF(〈S,<〉) ∧ PreProofρT (S, L) ∧ L(〈〉) = γ
)
.
We write [P|X ]ρTγ instead of [P]
ρ
T |Xγ.
The following is immediate from the definition:
Lemma 3.3. Given ρ ≤ σ ≤ ω, it is provable in ECA0 that [P|X ]
ρ
Tγ implies
[P|X ]σTγ.
The notion of provability [P] gives rise to a natural reflection scheme.
Definition 3.4. Given a theory T , ρ ≤ ω, and a set of formulas Γ, we define
a schema
ωP-RFN
ρ
Γ[T ] ≡ ∀A ∀n
(
[P|A]ρT φ(n˙,O)→ φ(n,A)
)
,
where φ(z,X) ∈ Γ with all free variables shown.
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We may omit the parameter ρ when ρ = ω, as well as the parameter T
when T is just the Tait calculus. This form of reflection gives an alternative
axiomatization for bar induction, as shown by Arai [1].
Theorem 3.5. RCA0 + ωP-RFNΠ1ω ≡ RCA0 +Π
1
ω-BI.
Note the analogy with Kreisel and Le´vy’s result; just as reflection is
equivalent to induction, ω-reflection is equivalent to transfinite induction.
As we will see, different formulations of ω-logic can also give rise to certain
forms of comprehension.
4. Countable ω-models and reflection
Another notion of reflection can be defined using ω-models. An ω-model is
a second-order model whose first-order part consists of the standard natural
numbers with the usual arithmetical operations. Because this part of our
model is fixed, we only need to specify the second-order part, which consists
of a family of sets over which we interpret second-order quantifiers. Moreover,
if this family is countable, we can represent it using a single set.
In order to have names for all the sets appearing in our ω-model, we in-
troduce countably many set-constants C = 〈Ci〉i<ω and let Π
1
ω(C) be the
second-order language enriched with these constants. With this, a satisfac-
tion notion can be associated to each countable coded ω–model in a natural
way. If M codes a sequence of sets, a satisfaction class onM is a set which
obeys the usual recursive clauses of Tarski’s truth definition, where each
constant Cn is interpreted as Mn. Let us give a precise definition:
Definition 4.1. Let M ⊆ N. A satisfaction class on M is a set S ⊆ Π1ω(C)
such that, for any terms t, s, n ∈ N, and sentences φ, ψ,
(t ◦ s) ∈ S ⇒ JtK ◦ JsK (◦ ∈ {=, 6=});
(t ◦ Cn) ∈ S ⇒ 〈n, JtK〉 ◦M (◦ ∈ {∈, 6∈});
(φ ∧ ψ) ∈ S ⇒ φ ∈ S and ψ ∈ S;
(φ ∨ ψ) ∈ S ⇒ φ ∈ S or ψ ∈ S;
(∃u φ(u)) ∈ S ⇒ for some n ∈ N, φ(n¯) ∈ S;
(∀u φ(u)) ∈ S ⇒ for all n ∈ N, φ(n¯) ∈ S;
(∃X φ(X)) ∈ S ⇒ for some n ∈ N, φ(Cn) ∈ S;
(∀X φ(X)) ∈ S ⇒ for all n ∈ N, φ(Cn) ∈ S.
Given a set of sentences Γ ⊆ Π1ω(C) closed under subformulas and substi-
tution by closed terms (including set-constants), if for every φ ∈ Γ we have
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that either φ ∈ S or ∼φ ∈ S, we will say that S is a Γ-satisfaction class. If
Γ contains all formulas of rank ρ ≤ ω, we say that S is a satisfaction class of
rank ρ. A pair M = 〈|M|, SM〉, where |M| is a set and SM is a Γ-satisfaction
class on |M| of rank ρ is a Γ-valued ω-model of rank ρ. If Γ is the set of all
sentences of Π1ω(C), we say that M is a full ω-model.
Satisfaction classes are used to define truth in a model:
Definition 4.2. Given an ω–model M, we write M |= φ if φ ∈ SM. If T
is a theory, we say that M is a (partial) ω-model of T if, whenever φ is a
theorem of T , it follows that M 6|= ∼φ. If A is an a-tuple of sets, we write
[M|A]ρTφ for the formula stating that, for every Γ-valued ω-model M of rank
at least ρ of T with φ ∈ Γ and |M|<a = A, M |= φ.
Since the first-order part of an ω-model is just the natural numbers, it is
easy to see that, for arithmetical sentences, truth in a model is equivalent to
truth. This partially extends to Π11-sentences:
Lemma 4.3. Let T be any theory and ρ ≤ ω. Then, if φ(z,X) ∈ Π11 with
all free variables shown,
ECA0 ⊢ ∀A ∀n
(
φ(n,A)→ [M|A]ρTφ(n˙,C)
)
.
Proof. First assume that φ is arithmetical, and let M be a model of T of rank
ρ. Then, an external induction using the definition of a satisfaction class
shows that, if φ holds, then M |= φ. Otherwise, assume that φ = ∀X ψ(X)
and M 6|= ∀Xψ(X), so that M 6|= ψ(Ck) for some k. But then, by the
arithmetical case, ψ(Ck) fails, so that ∀X ψ(X) fails.
The following claim is immediate from observing that every model of rank
σ is already a model of any rank ρ ≤ σ:
Lemma 4.4. Let φ be an arbitrary formula and ρ ≤ σ ≤ ω. Then,
ECA0 ⊢ ∀A
(
[M|A]ρTφ(C)→ [M|A]
σ
Tφ(C)
)
.
We may use ω-models to define a notion of reflection ωM-RFN
ρ
Γ[T ], anal-
ogously to Definition 3.4. The following is proven by Ja¨ger and Strahm [11],
and is a refinement of results of Friedman [8] and Simpson [16]:
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Theorem 4.5. Let 0 < n ≤ ω, and fix a finite axiomatization of ACA0 of
rank ρ. Then,
ACA0 + ωM-RFN
ρ
Σ
1
1+n
[ACA0] ≡ Π
1
n-BI0.
In fact, [P]γ and [M]γ are equivalent [9]. In the next section we will use
inductive definitions to define two further notions of provability, which are
also equivalent over a strong enough base theory.
Remark 4.6. In the literature, ω-model reflection is often presented as ‘If
φ is true, then φ is satisfiable in an ω-model’. We have presented it dually
as ‘If φ holds in every ω-model, then φ is true’. The two schemes are clearly
equivalent, but we prefer the latter for its symmetry with the other notions of
reflection we consider. Note, however, that we must replace φ by ∼φ to pass
from one to the other, and thus Theorem 4.5 is stated with Σ1n+1 in place of
Π1n+1 as in [11].
5. Inductive definitions of ω-logic
We may also formalize ‘provable in ω-logic’ in second-order arithmetic
using a least fixed point construction. To this end, let us review how such
fixed points may be treated in this framework.
5.1. Inductive definitions
Let us quickly review inductive definitions in the context of second-order
arithmetic. Below, recall that we are working in a language without negation
for non-atomic formulas.
Definition 5.1. Let φ be any formula and X a set-variable. We say φ is
positive on X if φ contains no occurrences of t 6∈ X.
A positive formula φ induces a map F = Fφ : 2
N → 2N, which is monotone
in the sense that X ⊆ Y implies that F (X) ⊆ F (Y ). It is well-known that
any such operator has a least fixed point.
Definition 5.2. Given a formula φ(n,X), we define the abbreviations
Closedφ(X) ≡ ∀n
(
φ(n,X)→ n ∈ X
)
(
X = µX.φ
)
≡ Closedφ(X) ∧ ∀Y
(
Closedφ(Y )→ X ⊆ Y
)
.
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It is readily checked that n ∈ µX.φ if and only if φ(n, µX.φ) holds. Such
fixed points can be constructed ‘from below’ using transfinite iterations of F :
if we define F 0(X) = X , F ξ+1(X) = F (F ξ(X)) and F ξ(X) =
⋃
ζ<ξ F
ζ(X),
then by cardinality considerations one can see that
µX.φ = F ω1(∅). (6)
On the other hand, we may define µX.φ ‘from above’ as the intersection of
all sets Y such that Closed(Y ) holds. The latter definition is available in
Π11-CA0, as is well-known (see e.g. [5]), and thus we see that:
Lemma 5.3. Given φ(X) ∈ Π0ω which is positive on X, it is provable in
Π11-CA0 that ∃Y
(
Y = µX.φ
)
.
In particular, the rules of ω-logic give rise to a positive operator, and a
theorem of ω-logic is any element of its least fixed point. Below, we develop
this idea to give alternative formalizations of ω-logic.
5.2. The iterative formalization of ω-logic
We may use (6) to formalize ‘φ is a theorem of ω-logic’, as in [6, 7].
There, provability along a countable well-order Λ is modeled using an ‘it-
erated provability class’ P , defined by arithmetical transfinite recursion as
follows:
Definition 5.4. Let Λ be a second-order variable that will be used to denote
a well-order and T be a formal theory. Define IterT (φ, P ) to be the formula
Tφ ∨ ∃ψ
(
ω-Rule(P, ψ) ∧T (ψ → φ)
)
.
Then, define
[Λ]Tφ ≡ ∀P
(
TRIterT (P,Λ)→ ∃λ ∈ |Λ| (φ ∈ Pλ)
)
;
[R]Tφ ≡ ∃Λ
(
WO(Λ) ∧ [Λ]Tφ
)
.
As before, write [R|A]Tφ instead of [R]T |Aφ, and for a set of formulas Γ and
ρ ≤ ω, define ωR-RFN
ρ
Γ[T ] analogously to Definition 3.4.
Recall that, by our convention, the parameter ρ will be omitted when
ρ = ω. This form of reflection gives rise to an axiomatization of ATR0 [6]:
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Theorem 5.5. Let U, T be c.e. theories such that ECA0 ⊆ U ⊆ ATR0,
ECA0 ⊆ T and such that ATR0 proves that any set X can be included in a
full ω-model for T . Let Γ be any set of formulas such that {0 = 1} ⊆ Γ ⊆ Π12.
Then,
ATR0 ≡ U + ωR-RFNΓ[T ].
In Theorem 6.6, we will extend this result to reflection over higher com-
plexity classes, and show that it also gives rise to an axiomatization of bar
induction.
5.3. Formalizing ω-logic via a least fixed point
We obtain strictly more powerful reflection principles if we model ω-logic
by an inductively defined fixed point, rather than its transfinite approxima-
tions.
Definition 5.6. Fix a theory T , possibly with oracles, and ρ ≤ ω. Then,
define a formula
SPC
ρ
T (Q) ≡ Q = µP.
(
Tγ ∨ ∃x ⊆ Q Rule
ρ(x,γ) ∨ ω-Rule(Q,γ)
)
.
If SPCρT (Q) holds we will say that Q is a saturated provability class of rank
ρ (ρ-SPC) for T .
With this, we may define our fixed point provability operator.
Definition 5.7. We define a formula
[I]ρTγ ≡ ∀P
(
SPC
ρ
T (P )→ γ ∈ P
)
.
We will write [I|X]ρTγ instead of [I]
ρ
T |Xγ.
We will often want to apply this operator to formulas rather than se-
quents; when this is the case, we will identify a formula φ with the singleton
sequent 〈φ〉, and write [I|X]ρTφ instead of [I|X]
ρ
T 〈φ〉. Since SPC’s are defined
via an inductive definition, their existence can be readily proven in Π11-CA0.
Lemma 5.8. Let T be any theory and ρ ≤ ω. Then, it is provable in Π11-CA0
that for every tuple of sets A there exists a set P such that SPCρT |A(P ) holds.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 5.3.
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It is important to note that we have defined [I|X]ρTγ by quantifying uni-
versally over all SPCs, so that ∼[I|X]ρTγ quantifies existentially over them.
This means that such consistency statements automatically give us a bit of
comprehension:
Lemma 5.9. If T is any theory and γ any sequent, then
ECA0 ⊢ ∀X
(
∼[I|X]ρTγ → ∃P SPC
ρ
T |X(P )
)
.
However, this instance of comprehension by itself does not necessarily
carry additional consistency strength, in the following sense:
Lemma 5.10. If T is a Tait theory extending ECA0,
T ≡Π01 T + ∀X ∃P SPC
ρ
T |X(P );
that is, the two theories prove the same Π01 sentences.
This is proven in [7] for a weaker notion of provability, but the argument
carries through in our setting. Roughly, we observe that T + T⊥ ≡Π01 T ,
but T + T⊥ ⊢ T + ∀X ∃P SPC
ρ
T |X(P ), since in this case an SPC would
simply consist of the set of all formulas.
Unlike the existence of SPCs, their uniqueness is immediate from their
definition.
Lemma 5.11. If T is any theory and ρ ≤ ω, we have that
ECA0 ⊢ ∀X ∃≤1P SPC
ρ
T |X(P ),
where ∃≤1P φ(P ) is an abbreviation of ∀P ∀Q
(
φ(P ) ∧ φ(Q)→ P = Q
)
.
As one might expect, adding new sets to our oracle gives us a stronger
theory:
Lemma 5.12. Let T be any theory and ρ ≤ ω. It is provable in ECA0 that
if A is a tuple of sets and there exists an SPC for T |A, then for any sequent
γ and any set B,
[I|A]ρTγ → [I|A, B]
ρ
Tγ.
Proof. Suppose that [I|A]ρTγ. Using our assumption, we may choose an SPC
P for T |A, so that γ ∈ P . Let Q be an arbitrary SPC for T |A, B. Observe
that Q contains all axioms of T |A and is closed under all of its rules, so that
by the minimality of P , we have that P ⊆ Q and thus γ ∈ Q. Since Q was
arbitrary, it follows that [I|A, B]ρTγ, as needed.
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Obseve also that our least-fixed-point formalization of ω-provability is at
least as strong as the formalization using ω-proofs:
Lemma 5.13. Given any formula φ and ρ ≤ σ ≤ ω, it is provable in ACA0
that [P|A]ρTγ → [I|A]
σ
Tγ.
Proof. Assume that [P|A]ρTγ holds, and let 〈S, L〉 be an ω-proof of γ. Now,
consider any SPC P , and consider the set S ′ = {s ∈ S : L(s) 6∈ P}, which is
available in ACA0. By the closure conditions of P , one readily checks that
S ′ cannot have a minimal element, and thus must be empty. In particular,
γ = L(〈〉) ∈ P .
Our goal now is to prove impredicative reflection within Π11-CA0. The
following is a first approximation: Π11-CA0 proves that any formula proven
in ω-logic with oracles is true in any ω-model.
Lemma 5.14 (ω–model soundness). Given any theory T , a-tuple A, and
ρ ≤ ω,
1. ACA0 ⊢ ∀P ∀A ∀n
(
SPC
ρ
T (P )∧pφ(n˙,O<a)q ∈ P → [M|A]
ρ
Tφ(n˙,C<a)
)
;
2. Π11-CA0 ⊢ ∀A ∀n
(
[I|A]ρTφ(n˙,O<a)→ [M|A]
ρ
Tφ(n˙,C<a)
)
.
Proof sketch. For the first claim, reason in ACA0. Let M be any model of T
of rank ρ and let P be a saturated provability class for T |A of rank ρ. Let
S ′ be obtained from SM by replacing each Ci with by Oi if i < a and by Va+i
otherwise. Then, S ′ is closed under all the rules and axioms defining P , so
that, by minimality, P ⊆ S ′. It follows that if φ(O<a) ∈ P , then φ(O<a) ∈ P
and so φ(C<a) ∈ SM; that is, M |= φ(C<a).
The second claim then follows from the first, together with the provable
existence of a unique ρ-SPC in Π11-CA0.
We remark that Lemma 5.14.1 may be formalized in a weaker theory, say
RCA0. However, this will not be relevant for our main results.
6. Completeness and strong predicative reflection
In this section we will recall some completeness results for formalized
ω-logic. It is well-known that ω-logic is Π11-complete [15], but it will be
convenient to keep track of the second-order axioms needed to prove this.
From these results, we will obtain a more general form of Theorem 5.5.
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6.1. Completeness results for ω-logic
We begin with a weak completeness result available in ECA0.
Lemma 6.1. Fix a theory T and ρ ≤ ω. Let γ(z,X) ⊆ Π0ω with all free
variables shown. Then, it is provable in ECA0 that
∀A ∀n
(∨
γ(n,A)→ [I|A]ρTγ(n˙,O)
)
. (7)
Proof. Reasoning within ECA0, fix a tuple n of natural numbers and A of
sets and assume that
∨
γ(n,A) holds, and write γ = (δ, φ) so that φ ∈ γ
holds. We proceed by an external induciton on φ. Assume that P is an
arbitrary SPC for T |X; we must prove that
(
δ, φ(n¯,O)
)
∈ P . If φ does not
contain quantifiers we proceed as in a standard Σ01-completeness proof, as
in e.g. [10, pp. 175–176]; we omit the details, but remark that the case for
atomic formulas requires a secondary external induction on the complexity
of the terms that may appear.
Now assume that φ contains quantifiers. Let us consider the case where
φ = ∀x θ. By the external induction hypothesis we have, for every k, that
(
δ, θ(k¯, n¯,O)
)
∈ P.
But, P is closed under the ω-rule, so we also have that
(
δ, ∀x θ(x, n¯,O)
)
∈ P.
The remaining cases follow a similar structure; the case where φ is a
Boolean combination of its subformulas is straightforward using the rules of
the Tait calculus, and if φ = ∃x θ(x), then for some k we have that θ(k) is true
and we may use the induction hypothesis plus existential introduction.
So, ECA0 already proves the completeness of ω-logic for arithmetical
formulas, but we need to turn to ACA0 to prove that it is also complete
for Π11 formulas. The following is a mild modification of the Henkin-Orey
ω-completeness theorem [9, 14]:
Theorem 6.2. For any formula φ(X) ∈ Π1ω and ρ ≤ ω,
ACA0 ⊢ ∀A ∀n
(
[M|A]ρTφ(n˙,O)→ [P|A]
ρ
Tφ(n˙,C)
)
.
The following is then immediate from Lemma 5.13:
19
Corollary 6.3. For any formula φ(X) ∈ Π1ω and any ρ ≤ ω,
ACA0 ⊢ ∀A ∀n
(
[M|A]ρTφ(n˙,O)→ [I|A]
ρ
Tφ(n˙,C)
)
.
For formulas of relatively low complexity, we can replace [M|A]ρTφ by φ:
Corollary 6.4. Let ρ ≤ ω.
1. Given φ(z,X) ∈ Π11 with all free variables shown,
ACA0 ⊢ ∀A ∀n
(
φ(n,A)→ [I|A]ρTφ(n˙,O)
)
.
2. Given φ(z,X) ∈ Σ12 with all free variables shown,
ACA0 ⊢ ∀A ∀n
(
φ(n,A)→ ∃B [I|A, B]ρTφ(n˙,O)
)
.
Proof. The first clam is immediate from Lemma 4.3 and Corollary 6.3. For
the second, suppose that φ(z,X) = ∃Y ψ(z,X, Y ), with ψ ∈ Π11(X, Y ).
Then, if φ(n,A) holds we can fix B so that ψ(n,A, B) is the case, and
we may use the first claim to conclude that [I|A, B]ρTψ(n¯,O, B¯), so that by
existential introduction we have [I|A, B]ρTφ(n¯,O).
6.2. Predicative reflection and bar induction
Using the results we have discussed on completeness of ω-logic and The-
orem 4.5, we may extend Theorem 5.5 to consider reflection for higher com-
plexity classes. Below, recall that the parameter ρ may be omitted when
ρ = ω.
Lemma 6.5. Let T be any theory. Then, over ATR0, the following are
provably equivalent: 1. [P|A]Tφ, 2. [M|A]Tφ, 3. [R|A]Tφ.
Proof. That 3 implies 2 is proven in [6], and that 2 implies 1 follows from
Theorem 6.2. Thus it remains to show that 1 implies 3.
Reasoning in ATR0, suppose that 〈S, L〉 is an ω-proof of φ. We use a
well-known technique of ‘linearizing’ 4, as in e.g. [1]. Consider the ordering
E on S given by sE t if one of the following occurs: (a) t 4 s, or (b) s, t are
incomparable under 4, and for the least i such that si 6= ti, we have that
(s)i ≤ (t)i. Then, it is readily verified that E is a well-order on S. Using
arithmetical transfinite recursion, let P be an IPC for T |A along 〈S,E〉.
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Then, a straightforward transfinite induction along 4 shows that, for all
s ∈ S,
∨
L(s) ∈ Ps; in particular, φ ∈ P〈〉. Since P was arbitrary, we
conclude that [R|A]Tφ.
Theorem 6.6. Let U be a theory such that ECA0 ⊆ U ⊆ ATR0. Then, for
any n ≤ ω,
ATR0 +Π
1
n-BI ≡ U + ωR-RFNΣ1
1+n
[ACA0]. (8)
Proof. The case for n = 0 follows from Theorem 5.5, in view of the fact that
ATR0 ⊢ Π
1
0-BI, so we assume n > 0. Let R ≡ U + ωR-RFNΣ11+n
[ACA0]. Let
ρ be the rank of an axiomatization of ACA0. Note that by Theorem 5.5,
ATR0 ⊆ R, and hence R ≡ ATR0 + ωR-RFNΣ11+n
[ACA0]. But, in view of
Lemma 6.5,
R ≡ ATR0 + ωM-RFNΣ11+n
[ACA0] ≡ ATR0 + ωM-RFN
ρ
Σ
1
1+n
[ACA0],
where the second equivalence is due to the fact that ATR0 proves that any
satisfaction class extends to a full satisfaction class. But, by Theorem 4.5,
ATR0 + ωM-RFN
ρ
Σ
1
1+n
[ACA0] ≡ ATR0 +Π
1
n-BI,
as needed.
In view of Lemma 2.2, it follows that Theorem 5.5 is sharp:
Corollary 6.7. ATR0 6⊢ ωR-RFNΣ12
[ACA0].
Remark 6.8. We could instead use Theorem 3.5 to obtain a variant of Theo-
rem 6.6 with the pure Tait calculus in place of ACA0. For greater generality,
it may be of interest to analyze the proof in [11] to identify the minimal
requirements on a theory T which would allow us to replace ACA0 by T .
7. Consistency and reflection using inductive definitions
In this section we will define the notions of reflection and consistency
that naturally correspond to [I|A]ρT . Moreover, we will link the two notions
to each other and see how they relate to comprehension. Below, recall that
⊥ denotes the empty sequent.
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Definition 7.1. Given a theory T , ρ ≤ ω, and a class of formulas Γ, we
define the schemas
ωI-RFN
ρ
Γ[T ] = ∀A ∀n
(
[I|A]ρT φ(n˙,O)→ φ(n,A)
)
,
ωI-CONS
ρ
Γ[T ] = ∀A ∀n ∼
(
[I|A]ρT φ(n˙,O) ∧ [I|A]
ρ
T ∼φ(n˙,O)
)
,
ωI-Cons
ρ[T ] = ∀A∼[I|A]ρT⊥,
for φ(z,X) ∈ Γ with all free variables shown.
Lemma 7.2. Given any theory T ,
1. if ρ ≤ ω, ACA0 + ωI-RFN
ρ
Γ[T ] ⊢ ωM-RFN
ρ
Γ[T ];
2. if ρ ≤ ω, Π11-CA0 + ωI-RFN
ρ
Γ ≡ Π
1
1-CA0 + ωM-RFN
ρ
Γ[T ].
Proof. For the first claim, reason in ACA0+ωI-RFN
ρ
Γ[T ]. Suppose that φ ∈ Γ
and [M|A]ρTφ(n¯,C). Then, by Corollary 6.3, [I|A]
ρ
Tφ(n¯,O), and thus φ(n,A)
holds by ωI-RFN
ρ
Γ. For the second claim, the remaining inclusion follows from
Lemma 5.14.
Of course, the schema ωI-CONS
ρ
Γ[T ] is only interesting when ρ < ω, since
otherwise it is just equivalent to consistency.
Lemma 7.3. If T is any theory and ρ ≤ ω, then
ECA0 + ωI-CONS
ρ
Π1ω
[T ] ⊆ ECA0 + ωI-Cons
ω[T ].
Proof. Reasoning by contrapositive, if ωI-CONS
ρ
Π1ω
[T ] fails, then for some for-
mula φ(z,X), some tuple of sets A and some tuple of natural numbers n,
we have that
[I|A]ρT φ(n¯,O) ∧ [I|A]
ρ
T ∼φ(n¯,O),
which applying one cut gives us [I|A]ωT⊥.
Let us now see that with just a little amount of reflection we get arithmeti-
cal comprehension. The fist step is to build new sets out of our provability
operators.
Lemma 7.4. Let T be any Tait theory, φ(z,X) be any formula and ρ ≤ ω.
Then,
ECA0 ⊢ ∀A ∃W ∀n
(
n ∈ W ↔ [I|A]ρTφ(n˙,O)
)
.
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Proof. Reason within ECA0 and pick a tuple of sets A. Consider two cases;
if there does not exist a ρ-SPC for T |A, then we may set W = N and observe
that ∀n
(
n ∈ W ↔ [I|A]ρTφ(n˙,O)
)
holds trivially by vacuity.
If such an SPC does exist, by Lemma 5.11 it is unique; call it P . Within
ECA0 we may form the set
W = {n : φ(n¯,O) ∈ P}.
Then, if n ∈ W is arbitrary we have by the uniqueness of P that [I|A]ρTφ(n¯,O)
holds. Conversely, if [I|A]ρTφ(n¯,O) holds, then in particular φ(n¯,O) ∈ P
holds and n ∈ W by definition, so W has all desired properties.
Since A was arbitrary, the claim follows.
Lemma 7.5. Let T be any theory and ρ ≤ ω. Then,
ACA0 ⊆ ECA0 + ωI-RFN
ρ
Σ
0
1
[T ].
Proof. Work in ECA0 + ωI-RFN
ρ
Σ
0
1
[T ]. We only need to prove Σ01-CA, that is,
∀X ∃Y ∀n
(
n ∈ Y ↔ φ(n,X)
)
,
where φ(n,X) can be any formula in Σ01(X).
Fix some tuple of sets A. By Lemma 7.4, we can form the set
Z = {n : [I|A]ρTφ(n¯,O)}.
We claim that ∀n
(
n ∈ Z ↔ φ(n,A)
)
which finishes the proof. If n ∈
Z, then, by reflection, φ(n,A). On the other hand, if φ(n,A) we get by
arithmetical completeness (Lemma 6.1) that [I|A]ρTφ(n¯,O), so that n ∈ Z.
The above result along with the completeness theorems mentioned ear-
lier may be used to prove that many theories defined using reflection and
consistency are equivalent. Below, ∼Γ = {∼φ : φ ∈ Γ}.
Lemma 7.6. Let T be a theory extending Q+, and ρ ≤ ω. Then:
1. if Σ01 ⊆ Γ ⊆ Π
1
1,
ECA0 + ωI-CONS
ρ
Γ[T ] ≡ ECA0 + ωI-RFN
ρ
Γ∪∼Γ[T ];
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2. ECA0 + ωI-Cons
ω[T ] ≡ ECA0 + ωI-RFN
ω
Π
1
2
[T ].
Proof. For the first claim, let us begin by proving that
ECA0 + ωI-CONS
ρ
Γ[T ] ⊆ ECA0 + ωI-RFN
ρ
Γ∪∼Γ[T ].
Assume ωI-RFN
ρ
Γ∪∼Γ[T ] and let φ ∈ Γ. Towards a contradiction, suppose that
for some tuple of natural numbers n and some tuple of sets A,
[I|A]ρT φ(n¯,O) ∧ [I|A]
ρ
T ∼φ(n¯,O).
By reflection, this gives us φ(n,A) ∧ ∼φ(n,A), which is impossible. Since
φ was arbitrary, the claim follows.
Next we prove that
ECA0 + ωI-CONS
ρ
Γ[T ] ⊇ ECA0 + ωI-RFN
ρ
Γ∪∼Γ[T ].
For this, fix φ ∈ Γ∪∼Γ and reason in ECA0+ωI-CONS
ρ
Γ[T ]. We first consider
the case where φ = φ(z,X) is arithmetical.
Let n be a tuple of natural numbers and A a tuple of sets such that
[I|A]ρTφ(n¯,O). If φ(n,A) were false, by Lemma 6.4.1, we would also have
that [I|A]ρT∼φ(n¯,O); but this contradicts ωI-CONS
ρ
Γ[T ]. We conclude that
φ(n,A) holds, as desired.
Before considering the case where φ is not arithmetical, observe that since
Σ01 ⊆ Γ, it follows that
ECA0 + ωI-CONS
ρ
Γ[T ] ⊇ ECA0 + ωI-RFN
ρ
Σ
0
1
[T ],
and by Lemma 7.5, we have that
ACA0 ⊆ ECA0 + ωI-CONS
ρ
Γ[T ],
so we may now use arithmetical comprehension.
With this observation in mind, the argument will be very similar to
the one before. Once again, suppose that [I|A]ρTφ(n¯,O) for some tuples
n,A. If φ(n,A) were false, by Corollary 6.4.2, there would be B such that
[I|A, B]ρT∼φ(n¯,O). By Lemma 5.9, ECA0 + ωI-CONS
ρ
Γ[T ] implies that there
exists a ρ-SPC for T |A, and hence we may use Lemma 5.12 to see that
[I|A, B]ρTφ(n¯,O) ∧ [I|A, B]
ρ
T∼φ(n¯,O).
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As before, this contradicts ωI-CONS
ρ
Γ[T ]. We conclude that φ(n,A) holds, as
desired.
Now we prove the second claim. The right-to-left implication is obvious,
so we focus on the other. Reason in ECA0 + ωI-Cons
ω[T ]. By Lemma 7.3,
this implies ωI-CONS
ω
Π1ω
[T ], so that using Lemma 7.5, we may reason in ACA0.
Fix φ(z,X) ∈ Π12 and assume that [I|A]
ω
Tφ(n¯,O). If φ(n,A) were false,
then by Corollary 6.4, we would also have [I|A, B]ωT∼φ(n¯,O) for some set B,
and using Lemma 5.12 as above,
[I|A, B]ωTφ(n¯,O) ∧ [I|A, B]
ω
T∼φ(n¯,O).
But this contradicts ωI-CONS
ω
Π1ω
[T ], and we conclude that φ(X) holds.
Next, we turn our attention to proving that reflection implies Π11-CA0.
This fact will be an easy consequence of the following:
Lemma 7.7. Let T be any theory, ρ ≤ ω, Γ ⊆ Π0ω(X), and φ(z,X) ∈ Π
1
1/Γ.
Then, it is provable in ACA0 + ωI-RFN
ρ
Π1
1
/Γ
[T ] that
∀A ∀n
(
φ(n,A)↔ [I|A]ρTφ(n˙,O)
)
.
Proof. Reason in ACA0 + ωI-RFN
ρ
Π11/Γ
[T ] and let A and n be arbitrary. For
the left-to-right direction we see that if φ(n,A) holds, then by provable
Π11-completeness (Corollary 6.4), [I|A]
ρ
Tφ(n¯,O) holds as well. For the right-
to-left direction, if [I|A]ρTφ(n¯,O), by ωI-RFN
ρ
Π1
1
/Γ
[T ], φ(n,A) holds.
We can now finally combine all our previous results and formulate the
main theorem of this section.
Theorem 7.8. Given any theory T ,
ACA0 + ωI-RFN
ρ
Π11/Σ
0
2
[T ] ⊢ Π11-CA0.
Proof. Work in ACA0+ωI-RFN
ρ
Π11/Σ
0
2
[T ]. By Theorem 2.1, we need only prove
comprehension for arbitrary φ(n,X) ∈ Π11/Σ
0
2(X).
Fix a tuple of sets A. By Lemma 7.4, there is a set W satisfying
∀n
(
n ∈ W ↔ [I|A]ρTφ(n˙,O)
)
.
But by Lemma 7.7, this is equivalent to
∀n
(
n ∈ W ↔ φ(n,A)
)
.
Since φ and A were arbitrary, we obtain Π11-CA0, as desired.
25
Thus impredicative reflection implies impredicative comprehension, as
claimed. Next we will prove the opposite implication, but for this we will
first need to take a detour through β-models.
8. Countable β-models and impredicative reflection
Our goal in this section is to derive a converse of Theorem 7.8. The main
tool for this task will be the notion of a countable coded β–model. In what
follows we shall discuss the definition and basic existence results for such
models.
Note that the converse of Lemma 4.3 is not always true for Π11-sentences,
as we are not truly quantifying over all subsets of N. Nevertheless, for special
kinds of models it may actually be the case that M |= ∀Xφ(X) implies that
∀Xφ(X) when φ is arithmetical; such models are called β-models.
Below, recall that V = 〈Vi〉i∈N is assumed to be a sequence listing all
second-order variables, and that S<a = 〈Si〉i<a for any sequence S.
Definition 8.1. A countable coded ω-model M is a β-model if for every
φ(z,V<a) ∈ Π
1
1 and every n, φ(n, |M|<a) holds if and only ifM |= φ(n¯,C<a).
Thus, β-models reflect Π11 formulas; however, with no additional assump-
tions, we can push this property a bit farther.
Lemma 8.2. Fix a formula φ(z,V<a) ∈ Σ
1
2. It is provable in ACA0 that,
for all a-tuples A and all n, if M is a β-model with |M|<a = A and such
that M |= φ(n¯,C<a), then φ(n,A) holds.
Proof. Write φ = ∃X ∀Y ψ(z,V<a, X, Y ) and suppose that A is an a-tuple
of sets and M a model with |M|<a = A. Then, if M |= φ(C<a), it follows
that for some m, M |= ∀Z ψ (C<a, Cm, Y ). But since by assumption M
is a β-model, it follows that ∀Z ψ(A, |M|m, Z) holds, hence so does φ =
∃X ∀Y ψ(A, X, Y ).
A good part of the theory of β-models may be formalized within Π11-CA0.
Theorems 8.3 and 8.4 may be found in [17]. Recall that we defined the
theories ATR0 and Π
1
ω-BI0 in Section 2.3.
Theorem 8.3. It is provable in ATR0 that, for every countable coded β-model
M, M |= Π1ω-BI0.
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We remark that Theorem 8.3 obviously holds if we replace Π1ω-BI0 by a
weaker theory, such as ACA0, ATR0, or others we have mentioned earlier.
However, Π11-CA0 is required to construct β-models:
Theorem 8.4. It is provable in Π11-CA0 that for every a-tuple of sets A
there is a full β-model M such that |M|<a = A.
With these results in mind, we can now easily prove that comprehension
implies reflection.
Lemma 8.5. Let U, T be theories such that U extends ACA0 and ρ ≤ ω. If
U proves that any a-tuple A can be included in an ω-model satisfying T of
rank ρ, then for any φ(z,X) ∈ Π12 with all free variables shown, U proves
that
∀P ∀A ∀n
(
SPC
ρ
T (P ) ∧
(
pφ(n˙,O)q ∈ P
)
→ φ(n,A)
)
. (9)
If U proves that any a-tuple A can be included in a β-model satisfying T of
rank ρ ≤ ω, (9) holds for φ ∈ Π13.
Proof. For the first claim, let φ(z,V<a) = ∀X ψ(z,V<a, X), where ψ ∈
Σ11 with all free variables shown, and reason in ACA0. Fix an a-tuple A
of sets, a tuple of natural numbers n, and a ρ-SPC P , and assume that
φ(n¯,O<a) ∈ P . Let B be arbitrary and M be an ω-model satisfying T with
|M|<a+1 = A, B. Then, by Lemma 5.14.1, M |= ψ(n¯,C<a, Ca), so that
by Lemma 8.2, ψ(n,A, B) holds. Since B was arbitrary, we conclude that
φ(n,A) = ∀Xψ(n,A, X) holds. The second claim is similar, but we take
ψ ∈ Σ12 and use Lemma 8.2.
Using the fact that Π11-CA0 proves the existence of a ρ-SPC, we obtain
the following:
Corollary 8.6. If ρ ≤ ω and Π11-CA0 proves that any a-tuple A can be
included in a β-model for T of rank ρ, then
Π11-CA0 ⊢ ωI-RFN
ρ
Π
1
3
[T ].
We may now summarize our results in our main theorem.
Theorem 8.7. Let U, T be theories such that ECA0 ⊆ U ⊆ Π
1
1-CA0, and
such that Π11-CA0 proves that any set-tuple A can be included in a β-model
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for T . Let Π11/Σ
0
2 ⊆ Γ ⊆ Π
1
3. Then, for any ρ ≤ ω,
Π11-CA0 ≡ U + ωI-RFN
ρ
Γ[T ] (10)
≡ U + ωI-CONS
ρ
Γ[T ] ≡ U + ωI-Cons
ω[T ].
Proof. All inclusions are immediate from Lemmas 7.5 and 7.6, Theorem 7.8
and Corollary 8.6.
Corollary 8.8. Let G = {ECA0,RCA
∗
0,RCA0,ACA0,ATR0} and ρ ≤ ω.
Choose U ∈ G ∪ {Π11-CA0} and T ∈ G ∪ {Tait,Π
1
ω-BI0}. Then, (10) holds
for U and T .
In view of Theorem 4.5, we may extend these results to reflection over
higher complexity classes.
Theorem 8.9. Let U be a theory such that ECA0 ⊆ U ⊆ Π
1
1-CA0, and let
ρ be the rank of some finite axiomatization of ACA0. Then, for any n < ω
and σ ∈ [ρ, ω],
Π11-CA0 +Π
1
n-BI ≡ U + ωI-RFN
σ
Σ
1
1+n
[ACA0]. (11)
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 6.6, the case for n = 0 is immedi-
ate from Theorem 8.7, so we assume n > 0. Let B = Π11-CA0 + Π
1
n-BI
and R = U + ωI-RFN
σ
Σ
1
1+n
[ACA0]. First we show that B ⊆ R. Since
U + ωI-RFN
σ
Π11/Σ
0
2
[ACA0] ⊆ R, we obtain Π
1
1-CA0 ⊆ R. We have that
Π11-CA0 + ωI-RFN
σ
Σ
1
1+n
[ACA0] ⊢ ωM-RFN
σ
Σ
1
1+n
[ACA0]
by Lemma 7.2. But, Π11-CA0+ωM-RFN
σ
Σ
1
1+n
[ACA0] ⊢ ωM-RFN
ρ
Σ1
1+n
[ACA0] by
Lemma 4.4, and we obtain R ⊢ Σ1n-BI by Theorem 4.5.
Next we show that R ⊆ B. By Theorem 4.5 and the fact that Π11-CA0
proves that any valuation can be extended to a full valuation, we have that
B ⊢ ωM-RFN
σ
Σ
1
1+n
[ACA0]. But, by Lemma 7.2,
Π11-CA0 + ωM-RFN
σ
Σ
1
1+n
[ACA0] ⊢ ωI-RFN
σ
Σ
1
1+n
[ACA0].
Since U ⊆ Π11-CA0 by assumption, the result follows.
Remark 8.10. Note that ωI-RFN
ρ
Γ[T ] is equivalent to the conjunction of the
two following statements:
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(1) Every ρ-SPC contains only true formulas from Γ,
(2) there exists a ρ-SPC containing any tuple of parameters A.
Thus it is tempting to conjecture that either (1) or (2) is sufficient to obtain
Π11-CA0. But this is not the case. Observe that ACA0 proves that RCA0
has ω-models of any finite rank ρ [17, Lemma VII.2.2], hence by Lemma
8.5, it proves that any ρ-SPC for RCA0 reflects Π
1
2 formulas, yet ACA0 (
Π11-CA0. Similarly, ATR0 proves that ACA0 has full ω-models [17, Theorem
VIII.1.13], so it proves that any ω-SPC for ACA0 reflects Π
1
2 formulas. We
conclude that (1) is not sufficient.
Meanwhile, by Lemma 5.10, T = ACA0+∃P SPC
ρ
ACA0
(P ) is equiconsistent
with ACA0, hence T ( Π
1
1-CA0. It follows that (2) is not sufficient either.
On the other hand, the reader may verify, using Lemma 8.5, that
Π11-CA0 ≡ ACA0 + ∃P SPC
0
RCA0
(P ) ≡ ATR0 + ∃P SPC
ω
ACA0
(P ).
9. Concluding remarks
We have shown that Π11-CA0 and its extensions with bar induction are
equivalent, over a weak base theory, to a family of proof-theoretic reflection
or consistency assertions formalized using least fixed points. This, together
with work on reflection principles based on ω-proofs and iterated approxima-
tions to a least fixed point, shows that many important systems of reverse
mathematics may be represented in terms of reflection principles for ω-logic.
This immediately raises the question of whether stronger theories may
be represented in a similar fashion, as well as theories in the language of
(say) set theory. Such an endeavour would most likely require working with
infinitary rules much stronger than the ω-rule, and may be a fuitful line of
future inquiry.
A second natural question is whether these results will lead to a Π01 ordinal
analysis of these theories, in the style of Beklemishev’s analysis of PA [3].
While this goal is part of the motivation for the present work, it is clear
that this would require many further advances, both in the proof theory of
reflection principles and in the study of transfinite provability logic.
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